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Abstract 
 
This article utilises the contemporary political theory of Nancy Fraser to explore the 
seemingly disparate issues of religious diversity and financial regulation in 
multicultural late capitalism, focusing on Islamic finance. In recent decades, Islamic 
finance has expanded into an almost trillion dollar global industry based around the 
rejection of riba, an Arabic word meaning usury. Whilst the growth of Islamic 
finance has been staggering, there has been little political or sociological analysis 
undertaken. This paper argues that Islamic finance challenges not only conventional 
financial wisdom and regulations, but raises numerous issues about religious identity 
and relationship between religion, politics and the economy. Analysing the 
development, principles and practices of Islamic finance, this paper argues that the 
seemingly staid field of financial regulation is actually a field wherein the politics of 
religious identity is very strong and wherein complex issues of cultural recognition, 
economic redistribution and political representation have emerged. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper examines the intersections between religious ethics, cultural politics and 
financial practice, focusing on the development of Islamic banking and finance in the 
context of multiculturalism. Although Islamic finance is attracting increasing interest 
inside and outside the Muslim majority world, analysis of the principles, practices and 
potentials of the industry has largely been limited to financial practitioners and 
scholars, lawyers, and Islamic scholars, typically those working within Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh). The broader fields of religion studies and the sociology of 
religion have rather neglected this area. This is understandable, however. The areas 
that the study of Islamic finance touches upon, such as financial regulation, banking 
practice and taxation law, are not particularly sexy. Not even in the midst of the 
largest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Equally, since the political analysis 
of Islam in countries such as Australia has largely been given over to the study of 
terrorism, there has been little to excite most scholars of religion in the study of 
Islamic collateralised debt obligations or Islamic accounting practices. 
But the neglect of this area is something of a shame. As this paper will argue, 
Islamic finance – as the most prominent element of the broader field of Islamic 
economics – is, in fact, full of the sort of juicy issues that scholars of religion like to 
get their teeth into. Some of the issues that this paper will touch upon in relation to 
Islamic finance are the relationship between religion and the state, the legal 
accommodation of religious difference, the mobilisation of religious political identity, 
comparative religious ethics and the relationship between religion and capitalism. In 
order to present a political analysis of this relationship between religion and finance, I 
am going to be using the heuristic schema developed by Nancy Fraser that analyses 
justice according to three criteria: cultural recognition, economic redistribution and 
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political representation. I will be arguing that despite developing and promoting 
various instruments of economic redistribution, Islamic finance also promotes cultural 
recognition. When we look to issues of political representation, however, we will 
clearly see some of the problems with Islamic financial practice and principle. 
Accordingly, after glossing the history of Islamic finance and explaining its basic 
principles, I will introduce some common Islamic financial products that put the 
principles into practice. I will then introduce Fraser’s ‘recognition, redistribution and 
representation’ schema, making a necessary correction along the way. Having offered 
an overview of Islamic financial principle and practice and Fraser’s political theory, I 
will then analyse Islamic finance according the Fraser’s schema, beginning with 
issues of cultural recognition in Islamic finance, then instruments of redistribution in 
Islamic finance, and concluding with a discussion of the broader issues of political 
representation in Islamic finance. 
 
The Development of Islamic Finance 
 
The most important historical and ideological point to understand is that Islamic 
finance is a part of the economic philosophy of Islamism. The use of the term is still 
in some dispute, but a good working definition is that ‘Islamism’ refers to a variety of 
political discourses wherein the solutions to social problems are rooted or expressed 
in the history, philosophy and language of Islam. Accordingly, Islamism is rather 
diverse and has its own versions of left and right. Islamic finance emerged as a subset 
of Islamic economics within the broader rise of Islamist political philosophy in the 
post-World War II period (El-Gamal 2003: 122-3). The general argument was that the 
Islamic state and society advocated by the Islamic neo-revivalists needed its own 
unique and intrinsically Islamic economic system rooted in Islamic economic 
teachings.1 
The early 1960s saw two significant developments. The first experiments in 
Islamic banking were developed at this time, in Malaysia in the form of a fund to 
assist those going on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, and in form of a bank developed 
in the town of Mit Ghamr in Egypt, based on the European savings banks models. 
Notably this bank did not identify as ‘Islamic’ to the German government that put up 
the initial capital, nor to Nasser’s secular authoritarian state, which it ran afoul of 
anyway (Kahf 2004: 29-30; Soliman 2004). Ironically, the Mit Ghamr bank would 
probably not be identifiable as an Islamic bank today, according to norms as they have 
developed that I will discuss below. The even more significant development was the 
literature produced on Islamic economics in Pakistan in the 1960s that laid out the 
framework for Islamic banking (El Ashker and Wilson 2006: 366-7). The most 
significant of these early publications was Muhammad Siddiqui’s Banking Without 
Interest (1969). Pakistan would later attempt to fully ‘Islamise’ its banking system in 
1979 (Warde 2004: 39) and the country has long been a focal point of Islamic 
economic thought, with many of the most significant Islamic economic and financial 
scholars and activists emerging in Pakistan at this time. 
Despite the early experiments in Egypt and Malaysia, Islamic banking and finance 
(and Islamic economics in general) was mostly theoretical, until 1973. It is important 
                                               
1 There are a lot of these. Wilson (1997: 117) calculates that over 1400 of the Qur’an’s 6226 verses are 
concerned with economics; that’s roughly 22%, covering matters ranging from alms, to inheritance and 
commercial contracts. This is before one looks to the hadith (sayings and activities attributed to the 
Prophet Muhammad) and thousands of volumes on law, commerce and economics accumulated over 
centuries. 
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to note that in this era of decolonisation in the Muslim majority world, Islamism was 
vying with other anti-imperialist ideologies, notably various Marxisms and 
nationalisms – and for some time, running a distant third. The Gulf Arab royalty – 
especially the Saudis – were prominent in promoting this pan-Islamic ideology, 
particularly as an alternative to pan-Arab identity. Now, although the Arab loss in the 
1973 Yom Kippur war was seen as partially redemptive after the disaster of the 1967 
war, the war’s wake would see the dominant ideology of the Arab world move from 
nationalism towards Islamism, and the political influence shift to the Gulf. Although it 
was a rather opportunistic stunt (notably on the part of non-Arab states) the 1973 oil 
embargo following the Yom Kippur War quadrupled the price of oil, leading to a 
massive accumulation of wealth into the so-called petro-states, especially Saudi 
Arabia (Warde 2000: 93, 2004: 39). This massive and sudden accumulation of capital 
made Islamic finance viable. Oil money in hand, 1974 saw the founding of the first 
self-identified Islamic financial institutions, the Jeddah-based Islamic Development 
Bank and the Dubai Islamic Bank. Islamic financial institutions opened in 
neighbouring countries in following years, including the Kuwait Finance House, the 
Bahrain Islamic Bank, the Qatar Islamic Bank and so on. Islamic financial institutions 
also wasted no time setting up in the tax havens of the world, in the Bahamas in 1977 
and Luxembourg in 1978 (El Ashker and Wilson 2006: 336). 
In more recent years, Islamic finance has expanded enormously (albeit from a tiny 
base) in the Muslim majority world and the non-Muslim majority world. Although 
most Muslim majority countries now have some form of Islamic banking or finance 
on offer, the bulk of the development in monetary terms has been in three places, the 
Persian Gulf, Malaysia and the non-Muslim majority world. The petro-states of the 
Persian Gulf have seen a renewed upsurge of extraordinary wealth given the current 
boom in oil prices, and flow-ons such as real estate and investments. Member states 
of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) 2  have some 36% of the assets of self-
identified Islamic financial institutions and Iran – which claims its entire banking 
system was Islamicised in 1983 (Warde 2004: 39) – has roughly 31% (Timewell and 
Divanna 2007). Secondly, Malaysia, which has some 12% of the assets of self-
identified Islamic financial institutions has developed Kuala Lumpur and the tiny 
island tax haven of Labuan into significant centres of Islamic finance – the latter 
currently overseeing the training conventional tax havens in the properly Islamic 
approach to the pious art of tax avoidance (Baba 2007: 396-7). Finally, the non-
Muslim majority world has developed as essential to Islamic finance. London, 
arguably the world centre of finance, has emerged as an integral Islamic investment 
hub, not least for the numerous conventional financial institutions like HSBC and 
ANZ who have developed Islamic ‘windows’, to offer Islamic financial products. 
Muslims in the so-called ‘West’ have also emerged as a market for Islamic finance 
and Australia has several Islamic financial institutions, primarily focussing on 
housing and personal finance and large-scale investment, most notably the Muslim 
Community Cooperative of Australia. 
Given the global diversity and political complications, it can be a little hard to get 
an accurate account of the size of the Islamic financial industry. This is partly because 
of the constant expansion and contraction of the financial sector and the problem with 
assessing the value of certain Islamic financial products at any given time, but also 
because of the activist boosterism of much of the industry, and the problem of what 
                                               
2 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. All but Oman have a 
significant presence in global Islamic finance. 
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actually counts as an Islamic financial institution or ‘Islamic capital’. Nevertheless, a 
good estimate is that the Islamic financial sector has assets somewhere between 
$US750 billion and $US1 trillion (Hawser 2008). A little over $US500 billion of this 
is held by self-identifying Islamic financial institutions (Timewell and Divanna 2007). 
To put things in perspective, this is less than 1% of the global financial sector, but it is 
roughly equivalent to the size of Australia’s GDP. What gets the broader financial 
industry excited is the growth of the sector, especially at a time when the conventional 
financial sector is contracting. The Islamic financial sector has grown around 10-15% 
per annum in recent years and the increase of Islamic financial institution’s assets in 
2007 was 29.7%, with Islamic banks in the GCC reporting yearly profit increases 
between 60% and 80% (Timewell 2008). All of which sounds very impressive, but the 
question I haven’t answered in this overview of the short history of Islamic finance, is 
precisely what it is that Islamic finance does, and why it even exists in the first place. 
So let me now look at the principles behind Islamic finance, and the financial products 
that have lead to this substantial economic growth. 
 
 
Islamic Financial Principles 
 
I am going to identify and discuss seven core values of Islamic finance. These are 
halal or permissible financial practices; the key differences with conventional finance 
that make the Islamic system identifiable, but also cause difficulties when Islamic 
finance seeks entry into conventional financial systems and their accompanying 
regulatory regimes. What we will see is that there is a good deal of dissent and 
controversy along the way, pointing to some of the complications that I will analyse in 
the second part of the paper. 
1. Profit, loss and risk must be shared. This is the core philosophy of Islamic 
finance. If one does not take a risk, one does not deserve to make a profit. 
Conventional finance is seen to place too much of the burden of risk on the borrower 
making unjust relationships.  
2. Avoid riba. Riba literally means the ‘increase’ or ‘excess’ above the principle 
on a loan. In use, however, it means usury since it is an inherently illegitimate practice, 
condemned at several points in the Qur’an, (e.g. 2:274-281). As well as creating 
unequal relationships, the argument is that insofar as profit from riba seeks to absolve 
the lender of all risk, it cuts God out of the equation, as it is God who may, or may not, 
grant success to a venture (3:130-132). Most significantly, within the practice and 
normative philosophy of Islamic finance, riba is interpreted as referring to all forms 
of interest. Amongst modernist Islamic scholars and contemporary theological and 
economic liberals, the interpretation of riba follows normative Christian revisions 
with usury referring merely to excessive or exploitative interest. This debate was 
ongoing at the time of the philosophical and practical development of Islamic finance 
but as far as the practice of Islamic finance today is concerned, the matter is settled 
(Kuran 2004; El-Gamal 2003: 109-111; Saeed 1996: 41-49, 119-125). If all interest 
were not condemned, the Islamic financial sector would arguably be unnecessary. The 
distinction that is made, then, is between usury and legitimate profit or compensation 
(Mews and Abraham 2007). 
3. Do not invest in haram (forbidden) products. This relates to what sort of 
enterprises will be financed by Islamic capital and what it is permissible to invest in. 
Obviously things such as alcohol will be haram for Islamic investors; nor can one 
invest in conventional finance, since this would be self-defeating. Weapons are 
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considered haram, and many Islamic mutual funds will also avoid entertainment 
companies producing films or music. Highly leveraged companies are also avoided 
given that indebtedness is anathema to Islamic finance. The real problem is trying to 
avoid conventional finance in investing. As a result of an inability to totally separate 
from conventional finance, Islamic investments often profit inadvertently from riba or 
other haram activities. In this case, the wealth is ‘purified’ by donating these profits to 
charity. 
4. Avoid investments that constitute gharar. Literally this is ‘hazard’, but it 
refers to transactions with too much uncertainty such that they have excessive risk and 
are therefore likened to gambling, which is condemned in the Qur’an (e.g. 50:90-91). 
Some highly risky (and potentially highly profitable) speculative financial products 
fall into this category. However, having no risk may be haram, as it may be 
considered riba. As Kahf (2002) explains, the difference between riba and gharar is 
that riba is prohibited because it contains no risk to the borrower and is thus an 
uneven contract, whilst gharar has too much risk as to be tantamount to gambling. 
The common element to both is that profit comes not through any effort of the lender; 
it is either a contract of chancing the unknown (gharar) or a sure thing (riba). 
5. The financial institution must pay zakat – This is alms of 2.5% for relief of 
poverty. It is considered one of the five pillars of Islam. 
6. Stay connected to the ‘real’ economy. Here we start to see some of the 
tensions between Islamic economic and financial theory, and Islamic financial 
practice. As Kahf (1999: 448) noted, Islamic finance always ties itself back in to what 
is called the ‘real’ economy; its concern is with material transactions of goods and 
services, and not with ‘parasitic’ financing, specifically, the secondary market and 
trading debt. However, the dominant practice and strategy of Islamic finance is to 
mirror conventional finance through the twinning of Islamic and conventional 
financial products, such that, as the influential Islamic economist M. Umer Chapra 
(2007: 326) explains ‘[t]here is hardly any significant need for financing that all the 
different modes of Islamic finance cannot together help satisfy.’ Accordingly, an 
Islamic secondary financial market is growing rapidly.  
7. The financial institution should be overseen by shari'a (Islamic law) 
advisors. This is the key regulatory difference. Islamic financial institutions are 
overseen by experts in Islamic law who function like auditors, overseeing the 
operation of the business and ensuring practices are halal. More controversially, they 
also help design the products that they then judge the religious bona fides of 
(DeLorenzo and McMillan 2007). These regulators have been called “rock star 
shari’a scholars” by Forbes (Morais 2007) since there are only several dozen globally 
who have the necessary training in Islamic law, conventional law as well as business 
experience to advise the companies. Accordingly, these sharia scholars typically sit 
on numerous boards, earning multi-million dollar salaries, wielding a great deal of 
power (Kahf 2004; Ram 2008). 
Having outlined the main distinguishing features of Islamic finance. I want to 
briefly look at some Islamic financial products; examples of how these principles are 
put into practice. 
 
 
Islamic Financial Products 
 
1. Murabaha contracts. These contracts are used in place of conventional loans in 
Islamic finance, but they are actually sales, no money is lent. The Islamic financial 
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institution will purchase the asset that the approved customer wishes to buy – 
typically a house – and then sells it to the customer at a mark-up. This is considered 
legitimate compensation for the risk it assumes, and allows a profit to the financer to 
continue offering the service. Murabaha contracts are an explicit compromise with 
conventional finance, designed to make Islamic finance competitive (Saeed 1996: 76-
95). From an accounting point of view, a murabaha contract appears identical to a 
conventional loan, but they are subjectively different to those involved in the contract. 
Although totally halal, they are very low risk – even compared to conventional 
financial equivalents – and they dominate Islamic finance. In the UAE and Bahrain, 
for example, murabaha contracts account for 85% and 96% of Islamic financing 
(Saleem 2007: 42-44). 
2. Ijara leases – This is a common cash-raising instrument, important since the 
prohibition on borrowing at interest restricts access to capital. They are mark-up or 
debt-based contracts, similar to murabaha sales. In an ijara contract, A. buys an asset 
and leases it to B. for fixed term and revenue.  
3. Musharaka and Murdaraba loans. From the perspective of the founding 
philosophy of Islamic finance and economics, these products are the real deal. They 
are entrepreneurial profit and loss sharing vehicles; precisely what Islamic financial 
theory intends. To relate them to conventional finance, they function much like 
venture capital. However, they are much riskier than conventional loans, and far 
riskier again than the very low risk murabaha and ijara contracts. Accordingly, 
despite the good will of Islamic financial and economic activists, these products are 
not popular.  
4. Takaful (Islamic insurance) This is administered as a co-operative pool of 
money and has its origins in the pooling of resources by traders in the Hijaz to provide 
compensation for caravans that went missing in the desert (El Ashker and Wilson 
2006: 23-24). In 2007, the takaful industry was worth some $2 billon, expected to 
double by 2010 (Ernst and Young 2008: 27). 
5. Qard hasan loans. These are charitable loans where only the principal is repaid. 
They are only common in poor Muslim countries, such as Bangladesh or Jordan 
(Saleem 2007: 42-44) and within the tiny, but growing area of Islamic microfinance 
(e.g. Khan 2008).  
6. Islamic equities. These are basically shares in enterprises considered halal. 
Special indexes have been developed to facilitate trade in Islamic equities, such as the 
Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (Siddiqui 2007). I mentioned the criteria for 
investment above, and because Islamic mutual funds and investors avoid highly 
leveraged companies, in troubled economic times – like today – they perform well. 
Islamic indexes have outperformed the market as a whole by 10% in the first quarter 
of 2008 (Aka 2008). 
7. Bai al dayn (‘sale of debt’) / sukuk (Islamic bonds). These products were 
developed in the more liberal Malaysian Islamic financial industry in the 1980s and 
1990s, and they have been controversial since the selling debt has been considered 
haram. Initially rejected in the Gulf, they very quickly changed their minds when they 
saw the potential (Trofimov 2007). A common type of debt-based security is a sukuk 
murabaha, a type of Islamic bond that involves the selling the right to receivables 
from Islamic mark-up sales and leases, which can then be traded. In 2007 this sector 
was worth over $US17 billion, up from just $US200 million in 2002 (Ernst and 
Young 2008: 19). Recently, one of the international shari’a boards ruled that up to 
85% of sukuk, were haram (Gassner 2008; Hamoudi 2008) for flouting various 
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Islamic laws. This has dampened the market as the industry awaits a resolution on this 
issue. 
Although these Islamic financial products indicate the way Islamic financial 
principles have developed in practice – in dialogue with conventional finance and 
global capitalism – the practical picture is still not complete. Since many of these 
products are quite abstract, I want to focus on Islamic home financing, one of the 
more common Islamic financial products in the non-Muslim majority world. It is here 
that we start to see more concretely some of the problems with Islamic finance. 
Although Islamic mortgages eschew interest, they are objectively almost identical to 
conventional mortgages insofar as the customer repays the principle of the loan and 
some excess. In order to be competitive, Islamic home financing typically follows the 
prevailing market interest rate, plus bank profit and administration costs which are 
higher than regular banks – not least because of the extra layer of (religious) 
regulation. The end result is that Islamic home financing costs more than conventional 
home financing. “The price for getting into heaven is about 50 basis points”, joked 
one mortgage banker (cited in Morais 2007). Wilson (2007: 434) notes that in 2005 an 
Islamic mortgage in the UK cost up to £100 per month ($200) more than a 
conventional mortgage, thus limiting their appeal to the UK’s large Muslim working 
class – many of whom cannot afford to purchase property in the first place, let alone 
at inflated prices. A similar situation exists in Australia where some three quarters of 
Muslims are working class (Zwartz 2006). It is asking a lot of a working class family 
to assume up to an extra $2,400 in mortgage repayments each year. 
Generally speaking, then, for the average Muslim in a country like Australia, 
Islamic finance has no history of working as an agent of economic redistribution. 
What, then, is the function and appeal of Islamic finance? Unlike Hamoudi (2007) 
who insists that it is the industry’s rhetoric of social justice that underpins its growth, I 
am going to suggest that this is subordinated within the abiding and growing appeal of 
Islamic finance as an agent of cultural recognition. 
 
 
Recognition, Redistribution, Representation. 
 
At this point, having introduced the principles and practices of Islamic finance, I am 
going to bring in the work of North American political theorist Nancy Fraser (1995, 
1998, 2007). Fraser’s work is a way of working through so-called identity politics that 
emerged on the left in the 1960s through second and third wave feminism and various 
civil rights movements. Fraser’s approach is excellent for weaving between 
complicated and multifarious issues of contemporary politics. In her heuristic, Fraser 
divides justice up into three areas: recognition, redistribution and representation. 
Recognition must be made of the cultural differences and value of different groups. In 
this case, Islamic finance recognises the beliefs of many Muslims that conventional 
finance is unethical and there is an alternative, halal way of banking and finance. 
Crucially, it also allows one to publicly perform their cultural identity. Accordingly, it 
would be an injustice to misrecognise this and assume that conventional finance is the 
only option. Redistribution, then, refers to addressing economic inequalities. For 
example, although Muslims are around 20% of the world’s population, they only 
contribute around 10% to the world’s GDP (Karasik, et al. 2007: 380); the Muslim-
majority world includes some of the richest nations in the world, such as Qatar and 
Brunei, and the poorest, such as Niger and Bangladesh. If Muslims feel conventional 
finance is unethical – that it misrecognises their beliefs and identity – they may not 
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use it, and will be further economically marginalised. The final issue is representation, 
the administration of political subjects. If Australian Muslims want to develop an 
Islamic financial sector, who should they speak to, and moreover who should speak 
for them? 
Now then, if we want to achieve justice according to this schema, there are 
various ways we can go about it. From the political left to the right: transformation 
and affirmation and, I will also add one more option Fraser does not talk about, 
reaction. Obviously this is antithetical to progressive politics, but its inclusion 
expands the analytical reach of Fraser’s schema. Accordingly, a transformative 
approach would radically restructure economic and political systems; a revolutionary 
change from one mode of production to another, like capitalism to socialism. In our 
case the question is whether Islamic economics unique enough to constitute 
something transformative and distinct to capitalism (or socialism) as the leading 
theorists of Islamic finance and economics have always insisted (e.g. Chapra 1995; 
Khan 1995; Naqvi 1994).3 A transformative approach to cultural issues would see 
identity become a play of “multiple, debinarised, fluid, ever-shifting differences” 
(Fraser 1995: 84). Fraser’s approach here is influenced by queer theory, which has not 
proved particularly influential within either Islamist or financial thought. 
Alternatively, we could opt for an affirmative approach to achieving justice, in the 
form of the liberal welfare state that will affirm the formal equality of citizens of the 
state, but not substantive equality. An affirmative approach would also allow a 
bureaucratic multiculturalism wherein private difference is largely paid for with 
public conformity. The third option I am adding here is reaction. This is a feature of 
populist and religious conservatisms. A reactionary approach focuses on injustice as 
the result of individual immorality more than social structures – a constant in various 
ideologies from neo-liberalism to conspiracy theories and religious revivals. One also 
sees a focus on social cohesion and conformity in the cultural sphere. 
With these approaches in mind, I want to spend the remainder of the paper 
analysing some of the political issues and implications of Islamic finance. I will start 
with issues of Issues of cultural recognition, then instruments of economic 
redistribution, and finally I will conclude with a discussion of the complexities of 
political representation. 
 
 
Issues of Cultural Recognition and Islamic Finance 
 
1. The Misrecognition of Islamic finance. Islamic finance has often been viewed as 
backwards and irrational – especially in rejecting interest. This fails to recognise the 
nearly universal prohibition on usury from world religions, including Judaism, 
Christianity and Hinduism, and many philosophies from the Ancient Greeks to 
Marxism. Such statements assume that liberal capitalism is universal; that cultural 
difference and religious teaching is irrelevant and liberal capitalism is natural. Equally, 
Islamic finance has also been wrongly associated with Islamic terrorism, especially 
after 9/11 (Warde 2004). This, however, was rather predictable and part of the broader 
misrecognition of Islam post 9/11 wherein practically everything from the Muslim 
majority world was viewed suspiciously through the lens of a violent threat. 
2. Pious Muslims’ rejection of conventional finance. Some Muslims will not 
use conventional banks as they consider their interest-based activities haram. It is 
                                               
3 This is not a question I have room to answer in this paper, but it is one I will be taking up elsewhere. 
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very hard to gauge how widespread this attitude is, however, but such an approach is 
quite rare. The more common approach is to purify perceived ill-gotten gains. 
However, since this issue functions as an identity-affirming political myth – 
constitutive of an ideological position and a rallying call – it functions well insofar as 
it would seem quite unjust to prevent Islamic finance developing where the is a 
significant Muslim population. 
3. National/state regulatory issues. In order to make Islamic finance viable in 
conventional systems, legal and regulatory changes have to be made. One example is 
changes to stamp duty on mortgages. Since Islamic house financing involves two 
sales, first to the bank, then the customer, it attracts double tax. On this issue the UK 
leads the non-Muslim majority world. The UK’s Finance Act (2003) eliminated 
double stamp-duty on Islamic home financing, opening up the market to Islamic and 
conventional providers (Housby 2006; Wilson 2007; Miller 2008). In Australia, the 
Victorian State government passed similar laws, but other states have not followed. 
This is where we see the limits of liberal multiculturalism and the notion of formal 
equality; such approaches fail to recognise more substantial cultural differences, and 
that in order to achieve substantive equality, sometimes the State has to treat citizens 
differently. 
4. Global regulatory issues. These days, financial institutions are subject to 
international regulations as well as national and local ones. These standards – such as 
the Basel II accords – are based on conventional financial approaches. As such, they 
assume certain activities are normative, such as borrowing at interest from the State, 
which Islamic banks will not do (see generally Archer and Karim 2007). This goes to 
the question of post-nation/state or post-Westphalian politics (Fraser 2007), evincing a 
lack of global political representation, uniformity and identity for Islamic finance.  
5. Secularising of economics/privatising of religion. Here we come to some 
more explicitly ideological issues. Hegemonic neo-liberal and neo-classical political 
and economic thought views economics as an amoral science from an epistemological 
perspective, and promoting the maximising one’s utility within one’s budgetary 
constraints from a policy perspective. As Al-Suwailem (2008: 15) argues, neo-
classical economics presents “an inherently static and fixed world where agents are 
isolated calculators, rather than human beings with emotions, values, and social 
relations.” There is no place here for religious sentiment or cultural difference. 
Equally, within liberal capitalism, religion is held to be a private matter that should 
not get in the way of making money. Accordingly, it is not just hegemonic economic 
attitudes that misrecognise Islamic finance, it has the dilemma of articulating its 
presence in a hostile political culture. 
6. Misrecognition of non-Islamic finance and Muslim difference. Finally in 
this section, I want to look at the issue of (mis)recognition from the other side. Islamic 
finance is grounded in Islamist discourse, thus it presents itself as an ethically superior 
approach to various rivals – in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly to Soviet and 
‘Western’ economies. Accordingly it equates Marxism with the Stalinism and state 
capitalist regimes of the former Soviet Union. Equally, it largely overlooks the 
voluminous work on business ethics within capitalism, in order to differentiate itself 
from the dominant economic ideology. Islamic finance is also guilty at times of 
ignoring the Jewish, Christian and especially the Ancient Greek origins of Islamic 
ethics, given that Islamism is often based on the myth of a pure Islam. Where it seeks 
to reach out to a broader consumer base, however, this sort of rhetoric is largely 
dropped. It is usually reserved for internal Muslim discussions. Hence another issue of 
misrecognition: Islamic finance projects a pan-Islamic identity and thus it does not 
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recognise differences adequately between Muslims, especially in terms of class. The 
development of Islamic home financing in the UK has done nothing to reduce 
working class Muslims’ access to affordable housing, for example, although it has 
benefited wealthy Muslims (Housby 2006). It is a little like the old joke, “what is 
good for General Motors is good for America”. In positing a cohesive, functionalist 
Islamic economy, Islamic economic and financial thought often displaces internal 
antagonism and in this sense it has a reactionary internal politics of recognition, 
whilst it projects an affirmative outward politics of recognition to the non-Muslim 
world. 
 
 
Instruments of Redistribution in Islamic Finance 
 
Most of the debate about Islamic finance in non-Muslim majority countries has 
focussed on these issues of recognition; why are they doing this, and is it really worth 
changing the tax laws over? However, part of the justification of Islamic finance is 
also that its works as an agent of economic justice; that it is a more equitable and 
efficient system. Sticking with Fraser’s schema, I am now going to analyse some of 
the instruments of redistribution in Islamic finance. 
1. Zakat. As I mentioned, this is alms of 2.5% on wealth above the poverty line 
for relief of poverty. Islamic financial institutions pay and administer this, part of the 
global privatisation of welfare. However, like regular taxes, avoidance is rampant. 
Sairally (2006) notes that Islamic financial institutions typically pay between 0 and 
2% of profits to charity. Given this, zakat is best viewed as a potential tool of 
redistribution. 
2. Reorientation of lending practices. Whilst conventional banks avoid risk in 
lending by favouring asset-rich borrowers, in theory, Islamic finance allows more 
access to capital by shouldering more of the risk and making finance available to 
more people. In reality, however, equity-based financing is rare and Islamic banks are 
often far more cautious about lending than conventional banks, setting higher 
standards for borrowers. Accordingly, given the attraction of debt-based financing, 
Khan (1995: 177-8) argues that a profit and loss sharing system is only a practical 
option for financial institutions if conventional lending practices are abolished – that 
is, within a transformed and wholly Islamic economy. 
3. Purification of profits. Since profit from haram sources is redistributed to 
charity, this is another source of economic redistribution. Much like the other 
charitable approach, zakat, this is somewhere between an affirmative approach, and a 
personal morality-based reactionary approach. Interestingly, much cultural output in 
the Renaissance was financed through purified wealth (Mews and Abraham 2007). As 
I indicated, however, Islamic banks rarely pay out more than 2% of profits to charity 
(Sairally 2006) and are getting increasingly good at isolating ‘Islamic capital’ as the 
industry develops in size and sophistication.  
4. Geographic and political redistribution. Since Islamic finance is based in the 
Middle East and South-East Asia, in theory, it will keep more money in developing 
economies and regions and the Muslim-majority world (see Wilson 2004). However, 
Islamic capital typically flows where conventional capital does, to the USA and 
Europe. Especially Gulf oil money, as part of the historical relationship between the 
ruling classes of the UK, the USA and Arab royalty. Indeed, Karasik, et al. (2007: 389) 
note that although London is an Islamic finance hub, most of its Islamic capital is 
Gulf Arab oil money, not the limited capital of the two million-or-so largely working 
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class British Muslims. This trend carries over to other European financial centres 
(Asokan 2008; Wilson 2007). Like everything about the Arab ruling class, we can 
thus file this under reactionary approaches.  
5. Community empowerment. In places like Australia or the UK, Islamic finance 
can keep money in minority communities, empowering them and developing social 
capital and community resources. It promotes social wealth, not personal riches, 
Wilson (2003) suggests. There is certainly investment in human resources and 
education in Islamic finance and small Islamic financial institutions are enthusiastic 
sponsors of community causes and community entrepreneurship, similar to 
community-based credit unions.  
6. Moralisation of economics. Since Islam does not separate economic activity 
and theory from faith and morals it offers a profoundly different philosophy from neo-
classical economics and liberalism. This may be where a transformative approach to 
redistribution may come from, if we agree with the founding fathers of Islamic 
finance and economics that Islamic economics is something wholly distinct from 
capitalism. The other approaches are largely affirmative, as we have seen. One of the 
issues here is that the philosophy of Islamic economics is now quite separate from the 
reality of Islamic financial practice where the approach is to develop the Islamic 
analogue of every conventional financial product (e.g. Chapra 2007). Thus, the 
industry has both an affirmative approach to economic redistribution: everything that 
conventional finance does, Islamic finance can do, whilst strengthening the existing 
cultural identity of its clients.  
 
 
The Politics of Representation in Islamic Finance 
 
Finally, I want to turn to issues of political representation wherein we will see the 
acceleration of some of the tensions within the philosophy and practice, and the 
history and future development, of Islamic finance. Hanging over all these issues is, 
of course, the basic question of what, precisely, is ‘Islamic’ – and who decides? Can a 
few dozen millionaire male “rock star shari’a scholars” (Morais 2007) really 
represent the interests of over a billion, mostly impoverished, Muslims? 
1. Democracy and Political Tensions. These are the most obvious issues when 
analysing the political representation and Islamic finance. Islamic finance is based in 
the Persian Gulf, particularly the member states of the GCC wherein feudal political 
relations sit alongside capitalist economic relations. The inequalities of the Muslim-
majority world are most evident here, where endlessly exploitable and replaceable 
foreign workers from around the world work to build the world’s tallest building and 
indoor desert ski-resorts. Basic notions such as the rule of law are absent in these 
Kingdoms, hampering their economic development. With ongoing concerns about 
corruption and torture at the hands of authorities in Dubai (Kerr 2008), for example, 
as well as broader concerns about legal systems (Yusuf 2004), despite regional desires 
to develop financial centres these are unsustainable without transparent legal systems, 
which require accountable and democratic political systems. It is little wonder, then, 
that the Gulf uses the comparatively simple mark-up products over profit-and-loss 
sharing contracts which provoke far more legal complexity in the case of the 
breakdown of the partnership, far more than other jurisdictions (Yusuf 2004). It is also 
little wonder that the UK and potentially Australia are such attractive locations for 
Islamic capital, even with the legal complexities that the clash of jurisdictions and 
legal cultures can cause (e.g. Foster 2007). 
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In South East Asia, Islamic finance also raises issues of political representation, 
notably the rise of Islamic finance in Malaysia alongside the simultaneous rise of 
capitalist modernity and prosperity in the country and the rise in Islamic institutions, 
under the government of Mahathir (Eyre 1995; Fenton 2003). In fact, nowhere has 
Islamic finance prospered without the support of authoritarian or downright despotic 
political rulers. Islamic financial institutions enjoy government support in various 
ways; sometimes it has the outright prohibition on conventional banking or rival 
banks, at other times its more familiar State guarantees of assets. The irony is that the 
same feudal and non-transparent nature of governments that leads them to offer such 
largess to Islamic financial institutions also leads to searches for alternate centres of 
Islamic capital.  
2. Multiculturalism and Islamic Finance. For their part, centres of Islamic 
capital in the non-Muslim world such as London and rivals such as Paris betray their 
own underlying approach to political representation and accountability by showing a 
distinct bias for Gulf-based big ticket financing above the interests of their local, 
largely working class Muslim populations, where the development of international 
merchant banking is well ahead of retail banking (Wilson 2007; Asokan 2008). At the 
same time, the development of hubs such as London could be seen as the 
commodification of Islamic ethics, within the broader approach of liberal 
multiculturalism to “promote any aspect of cultural difference, which can be turned 
into a distinctive product or selling proposition” (Housby 2006: 29). This is similar to 
Fish’s (2001) critique of liberalism’s ‘boutique multiculturalism’ wherein minor 
cultural differences are tolerated and exploited, whilst at the same time foreclosing on 
any more substantive differences. 
Thus, one could also ask whether the development of Islamic finance in countries 
like Australia and the UK perpetuates the reification of cultural difference. One of the 
key problems with the bureaucratic liberal multiculturalism in countries like Australia 
is the tendency to ossify and reify cultural difference down to what Jameson (2000: 67) 
calls ‘anthropological tics and oddities’. In our multicultural comedy of manners, 
Muslims may merely become those we do not offer credit cards just as Jews become 
those we do not wish a Merry Christmas. In a diverse society, an essential question is 
whether cultural differences – religious or otherwise – can contribute to a society that 
is necessarily greater than the sum of its parts and is still capable of reinventing itself 
(see McLennan 2008).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the real questions running through this paper, then, is whether it is possible to 
think beyond liberal capitalism. This is a fundamental question of Islamic finance; is 
it offering anything different to conventional capitalism, or simply capitalism with a 
pious face? In other words, is there anything that Islamic financial ethics offers to the 
rest of the economy and society, or does it merely reproduce and translate the norms 
of capitalism into a particular vernacular? According to its principles, founded on the 
Qur’an, hadith and centuries of Islamic legal and economic thought, it seems to offer 
a complex and coherent philosophy of finance. Equally, it has developed a variety of 
financial products that can be integrated with conventional legal and financial systems, 
as well as offering a different subject approach to commercial life and banking. 
However, as we’ve seen, there are a number of tensions running through Islamic 
finance. It is rooted in the politically and culturally reactionary discourse of Islamism. 
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This rhetoric influences its presentation and utility within the Muslim community – 
the development of a strong and (partially) separatist Islamic identity grounded in 
religious prohibitions. At the same time, it presents itself to the financial and political 
systems of the non-Muslim majority world as largely interchangeable with 
conventional financial capitalism. The fundamental contradiction of Islamic finance 
then is that it seeks to be as professionally proximate as possible to conventional 
financial practice, whilst at the same time maintaining its religious objection to the 
very existence of the system it seeks to replicate. Precisely how this contradiction will 
be resolved - or whether it even can be resolved – is not clear, not least because 
Islamic finance is growing and developing at such a pace. Accordingly, it is not easy 
to say whether the current and future shape of Islamic finance is transformative, 
affirmative or reactionary.  
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